Purchase Money Loans by McGrew, Glen W.
Chicago-Kent Law Review




Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/cklawreview
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarly Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion
in Chicago-Kent Law Review by an authorized editor of Scholarly Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law. For more information, please
contact dginsberg@kentlaw.iit.edu.
Recommended Citation
Glen W. McGrew, Purchase Money Loans, 8 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 4 (1929).
Available at: https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/cklawreview/vol8/iss1/2
Purchase Money Loans
By Glen W. McGrew*
A loan made to one who desires to use
the money to purchase real estate, with a
trust deed or mortgage on the premises
to be purchased as security for the pay-
ment of the debt, is frequently an import-
ant factor in real estate transfers. Any
legal principle that would expedite the
handling of transfers in which this fea-
ture is involved should, therefore, be of
considerable practical value.
Those who loan money on real estate
are, of course, primarily interested in
securing a lien upon the premises that is
superior to all other claims, such as judg-
ments against the borrower, other mort-
gages executed by him, mechanics' liens
arising out of his contracts, his wife's
dower, homestead rights, etc. It is a
matter of common knowledge, even among
many laymen, that a purchase money
mortgage of the conventional type, given
by the purchaser to the seller to secure
the unpaid portion of the purchase price,
is a lien on the property superior to all
claims of every kind arising through the
purchaser. Does a loan to the purchaser,
by one who is a stranger to the contract
of purchase, enjoy this same privileged
position?
Local Practice
It is the commonly accepted opinion
among mortgage investment firms, and
even among members of the legal profes-
sion, in Chicago, that such a loan is not
entitled to purchase money priority. This
is proved by the invariable local practice
of insisting that the trust deed or mort-
gage, given by the purchaser to the party
who advances the money, shall be re-
corded, and a search made for possible
judgments against the purchaser, before
the proceeds of the loan are disbursed to
the seller to obtain his deed to the pur-
chaser. If the purchaser's wife happens
to be traveling in Europe, it is considered
absolutely essential that the trust deed
be sent to her for execution, in order that
her dower and homestead rights may be
waived. Thus it is apparent that title
expenses and the time required to com-
plete the transaction, together with in-
terest charges resulting from this delay,
could be materially reduced if the holder
of notes secured by such a trust deed or
mortgage were entitled to the same privi-
leges that are universally accorded to the
seller who takes back a purchase money
mortgage.
Fiction v. Equity
The cases commonly state as the reason
for these privileges, the theory that de-
livery of a deed by the seller, and the
simultaneous delivery to him of a mort-
gage by the purchaser to secure the un-
paid portion of the purchase price, gives
the purchaser only a "transitory seizin,"
a thing so fleeting and evanescent that it
is gone before the lien of judgments
against the purchaser, or his wife's dower,
can lay hold upon it. (1 Coke on Little-
ton, Chap. 5, Sec. 36; 19 R.C.L. 41'6.) In
the words of one learned judge, "The
title did vest, but did not rest, in Jones,
but [was] 'like the borealis' race, that flits
ere you can point its place'." (Bunting
v. Jones, 78 N. Car. 242.) This smacks
too much of the common law fictions to
satisfy those who seek the underlying
fundamental basis for the rule. The real
reason is nowhere better set forth than
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in the case of Banning v. Edes, 6 Minn.
402 (Gil. 270): "The deed and mortgage,
then, are to be considered as a single in-
divisible bargain or contract of sale, and
as if they were written in one instru-
ment, and executed at the same instant
by both parties. By the mortgage, a con-
dition was annexed to the grant, and
whatever passed by the grant, passed sub-
ject to the condition. There was no
moment of time when Baker (the pur-
chaser] owned, or held, the premises free
from the condition, nor 'when he could
voluntarily have conveyed them, except
subject to the mortgage. Can a judgment
creditor, then, by virtue of his judgment
[against the purchaser], obtain a greater
interest in the premises than the debtor
himself had? I think it is well settled,
that the lien of the judgment will, in all
cases, be limited to the actual interest
which the judgment debtor has in the
estate. 1: Atk. on Conv., 512; 1 Paige,
128; 4 Paige, 9. The rule is based on
principles of justice and public policy, as
well as common sense, and can work no
hardship to the judgment creditor. So
far as the contract between Pairo [the
seller] and Baker [the purchaser] is con-
cerned, there can be no question but that
it was the intent to give Pairo the first
lien on the premises; nor can it be
claimed that he would have parted with
the premises on any other condition. The
judgment creditor having parted with
nothing on the strength of this convey-
ance to Baker, it would be highly inequit-
able to permit the judgment to be satis-
fied out of what, in fact, was Pairo's
property."
Lender is Part Purchaser
The force of this argument does not
weaken when applied to the case of a
loan by a third person, to the purchaser,
of money with which to make the pur-
chase. This third person is really in a
position analogous to that of one who has
agreed to buy an undivided fractional in-
terest in the premises at the same time
that the borrower purchases the remain-
ing portion. Under this supposed state
of facts, a judgment against the borrower
would, of course, be a lien only upon his
undivided fractional interest (his equity
of redemption) in the premises. "A mort-
gage is pro tanto a purchase, and the
bona fide mortgagee is equally entitled to
protection as the bona fide grantee."
Pierce v. Faunce, 47 Me. 507; cited with
approval in Hayden v. Snow, 14 Fed. 70,
and Jones on Mortgages, Sec. 877, (8th
Ed.).
The proposition is further supported by
showing how easily a contrary ruling can
be circumvented by the parties. Instead
of loaning money to the purchaser, the
third party can agree to purchase from
the seller the notes which the seller re-
ceives from the buyer, secured by a pur-
chase money mortgage. There is no legal
obstacle whatever to such an arrange-
ment, even though the seller has previ-
ously contracted to sell only for cash, and
the purchaser has previously applied for
a loan from the third party. In fact,
this method of handling the transaction
is not infrequently resorted to in our
local practice. The final result is exactly
the same; the seller gets his cash, the
purchaser of the notes gets a lien on the
property prior to all -claims arising
through the mortgagor, and the pur-
chaser acquires only an equity of redemp-
tion, which is exactly what each would
have had if the loan had been made to
the purchaser as originally contemplated.
Weight of Authority
It is not surprising, therefore, to find
upon examination of the cases that, by
the almost unanimous weight of author-
ity, and with certain qualifications here-
inafter discussed, a mortgage loan made
to a purchaser is entitled to the same
priority that is accorded to the conven-
tional type of purchase money mortgage
given by the purchaser to the seller as
part of the consideration for the property.
The authorities are too numerous to be
cited at length at this point, but they
will be found collected in 19 R. C. L. 416;
41 C. J. 531; and 40 L. N. S. 272, note.
Whence, then, comes our local practice of
recording the trust deed or mortgage first,
and searching for possible judgments
against the purchaser? Is the state of
Illinois an exception to the general rule?
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The search for an answer to these ques-
tions reveals the surprising fact that, not
only is Illinois not an exception to the
rule, but our Supreme Court, as will ap-
pear from the cases hereinafter cited, has
gone probably farther than any other
court in developing and refining the rule.
Leading Cases
There are three cases in point that are
more frequently cited than any others,
and they may therefor fairly be called
the leading cases on the subject. They
are Clark v. Munroe, 14 Mass. 351;
Jackson v. Austin, 15 Johns. (N. Y.) 477;
and Curtis v. Root, 20 Ill. 63. These
cases will be examined in chronological
order.
The Massachusetts case, decided in
1817, was a contest between Hannah
Clark, the widow of the purchaser, claim-
ing dower, and Israel Munroe, assignee
of Winthrop, who had furnished the con-
sideration for the aeed by which Clark
acquired title to the premises in question.
The transaction was carried out pursu-
ant to a previous agreement between all
tha parties, the vendor, purchaser, and
lender, and the deed and mortgage were
dated, acknowledged, and recorded at the
same time. The decision of the court on
these facts was as follows: "In the case
of Holbrook vs. Finney, 4 Mass. 566, it
was decided that a conveyance in fee, and
a reconveyance by the grantee to the
grantor in mortgage, being considered as
parts of the same transaction, did not
give to the grantee such a seisin as en-
titled his wife to have dower in the
granted premises. In the case at bar, the
mortgage was to a third party; but still
the whole constituted but one transaction.
We are not able to view the case in any
light different from what it would have
presented had the mortgage of Clark been
made to Andrews and his wife [the sell-
ers] instead of Winthrop."
The New York case, decided in 1818,
hinged upon the application to the facts
in the case of a statute (1 N. R. L. 376)
which declared that "whenever lands are
sold and conveyed, and a mortgage is
given by the purchaser, at the same time,
to secure the payment of the purchase
money, such mortgage shall be preferred
to any previous judgment which may
have been obtained against such pur-
chaser." The lien of the Judgment cred-
itor was held to be inferior to that of the
mortgage given by the purchaser to a
third party who advanced the purchase
money. The court declared that "The
mortgage In this case comes within the
letter of the act. It was executed by the
purchaser, Van Deusen, to secure the pur-
chase money, and was given at the same
time with the deed, although not given
to Cooper, from whom Van Deusen de-
rived title. But this cannot vary the
principle upon which the statute appears
to be founded. The lessor of the plaintiff
advanced the purchase money, and took
the mortgage to himself. The Act prob-
ably contemplated cases where the mort-
gage was given to the seller of the land.
But the words of the act are not re-
stricted to such cases, and a just and fair
construction will warrant its application
to the present case."
This case was cited and followed thirty
years later in Haywood v. Nooney, 3 Barb.
643, (N. Y.), where it was pointed out
that "In its legal effect it is the same as
though the purchaser had executed his
mortgage to the vendor, for the purchase
money, and he had then assigned It to the
party advancing the money."
The case of Curtis v. Root, supra, was
the earliest decision on the subject in
Illinois, (1858), and the principle con-
tended for was heartily endorsed in the
following words: "It is a principle of
law too familiar to justify a reference to
the authorities, that a mortgage given for
the purchase money of land, and executed
at the same time the deed is executed to
the mortgagor, takes precedence of a judg-
ment against the mortgagor. * * * Indeed,
nearly all the cases to be met with are
cases where the mortgage has been given
to the vendor and for the purchase
money. Such is not the case before us.
The facts were, that the lands were pur-
chased with goods, which might be con-
sidered as equitably belonging to the
mortgagee, and which the mortgagor sold
to the vendor for the land with the con-
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sent of the mortgagee, so that in sub-
stance the transaction was the same as
if the purchase money had been paid by
the mortgagee, who took the mortgage to
secure himself for the purchase money
thus advanced, and the jury have found,
and we think properly, that the execution
of the deed and mortgage were simultane-
ous acts. This brings the case within the
letter and the equity of the rule as first
stated. In point of right and principle, it
can make no difference whether the mort-
gage is given to the vendor for the pur-
chase money, or to another who actually
advances the means to pay the purchase
money to the vendor." ("It is true, that
the judgment, which was affirmed in
Curtis v. Root, 20 Ill. 53, was afterwards
reversed in the same case, as reported in
28 Ill. 367 and 38 Id. 192, upon other
grounds,***" Roane v. Baker, 120 Ill. 308,
at page 314.)
Cases Classified
The instances in which the courts of
this country have cited and followed
these three cases, or others which uphold
the same principle, are so numerous that,
instead of listing them here, seriatim, the
present writer, after an exhaustive
search, venture the assertion that no case
can be found in the reports, which is op-
posed to the inclusion of such mortgages
in the classification of purchase money
mortgages, provided that the facts cor-
respond in every detail with the facts of
these three cases. This proviso, it will
be noted, excludes the following enumera-
ted classes of cases: (1) Those in which
the lender did not deal with the seller,
but relied upon the purchaser's mortgage,
and paid the proceeds of the loan direct
to the purchaser. (2) Those in which
the delivery of the deed by the seller to
the purchaser and the delivery of the
mortgage to the lender were not simul-
taneous acts, or parts of one transaction.
(3) Those in which the facts were such
as to estop the mortgagee from claiming
a prior lien, e.g., actual notice of an-
other purchase money mortgage from the
purchaser to the seller, with no agree-
ment between the parties as to which
should have priority; or other equitable
considerations which operate to prevent
the application of the rule in particular
instances. (4) Those in which no mort-
gage was actually executed, as where the
lender relied upon the purchaser's prom-
ise to execute a mortgage, which promise
later becomes the basis of an effort by
the lender to establish his lien in prefer-
ence to other liens arising through the
purchaser. (5) Those in which the
recording acts, or other statutes, of par-
ticular states, operate in such a way,
under certain circumstances, as to give
other claimants a lien superior to that
of the mortgagee.
Those exceptions falling under classes
four and five will be eliminated altogeth-
er from this discussion in order to
narrow the scope of the inquiry.
The authorities furnish little or no
basis for a classification according to the
nature of the claim arising through the
purchaser, for which priority is sought
over the mortgage of the lender; dower,
homestead, judgments, mechanics' liens,
other mortgages, (except those to the
seller, which will be discussed under class
three) all fare alike in the different
jurisdictions. But the cases falling under
the first three classes enumerated above
are of great practical importance, and
they will now be discussed in order.
Lender Must Deal With Seller
The Illinois Supreme Court was one
of the first to lay down a strict rule to
the effect that the lender, if he desires
his mortgage to enjoy the privileges ac-
corded to a purchase money mortgage,
must deal direct with the seller, instead
of paying the proceeds of the loan to the
purchaser, with the privilege of investing
it in the land on which the mortgage is
given to secure the loan, or in something
else, at his pleasure. The point was first
before the court in Jeneson v. Garden, 29
Ill. 199, (1862), where the dower right
of the purchaser's widow was held to be
superior to the mortgage to secure money
loaned to the purchaser. There is noth-
ing in the case as reported to show any
agreement between the lender and the
seller. The opinion simply states that
"This was not purchase money, within
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the meaning of our dower law. That
means money due the vendor, for land
purchased on a credit, and does not mean
money borrowed of a third person and In-
vested in the purchase of the land."
There is no intimation that the decision
would have been otherwise if the lender
had dealt with the seller; in fact, it is
rather doubtful whether the court even
considered the question, as the facts did
not make it necessary for them to pass
upon this point. The opinion contains
no citations and no reasoning other than
the fiat above quoted.
Misleading Decision
The later case of Eyster v. Hatheway,
50 Ill. 521, (1864), is no doubt, the basis
of the local practice in Chicago of record-
ing the mortgage to the lender first and
searching for judgments against the
purchaser, before closing the deal. The
following pasage from that case certainly
appears to conclude any further discus-
sion on the point. "The statute, in de-
claring that the homestead right should
not be claimed against a debt due for the
purchase money, obviously used the
language in its ordinary and popular sig-
nification. All persons understand the
term purchase money to mean the price
agreed to be paid for the land, or the
debt created by the purchase. It is not
understood to mean a debt due another
person than the vendor. In this case, the
debt was created for money loaned, and
not for land purchased. Appellee sold no
land to appellant, but he loaned him
money. It could not matter, in this in-
debtedness, whether the money was sub-
sequently paid for the same or for other
property. There is nothing in the case
which shows the relation of vendor and
vendee between these parties, and this
provision of the statute only applies to
parties occupying that relation, or those
representing them, and for a debt created
by the purchase of the homestead."
It is not surprising that the ring of
finality in this pronouncement should lead
the court of at least one other state to
cite the case as contra to the weight of
authority on the subject. (Ladd & Tilton
Bank v. Mitchell, et al, 93 Ore. 668, 184
Pac. 282). This opinion, rendered two
years later than Jeneson v. GaTden,
supra, is likewise devoid of citations on
the point under discussion, and here too
the court neglects to intimate that there
might be any remotely similar circum-
stances under which a purchase money
loan would have preference over dower,
homestead, and other claims arising
through the purchaser. Counsel and
court, in both cases, seem to have over-
looked Curtis v. Root, supra, decided only
six years before Eyster v. Hatheway.
But the case is misleading, when con-
sidered by itself, for before the report
of this case was published (the papers
having been lost so that it could not be
reported in its proper place) the court,
in Austin v. Underwood, 37 Ill. 439, de-
cided at the April term, 1865, made this
comment: "We said in the case of Eyster
v. Hatheway, decided at April term, 1864,
that money borrowed of a third person,
and paid out by a purchaser of land,
cannot be regarded as purchase money.
It is the common understanding of the
term purchase money, that it means
money paid for the land or the debt
created by the purchase. In that case,
the money was borrowed to pay a pre-
existing debt; in this case the land was
purchased with the money of appellant
and actually paid over by him for the
land, not one dollar of it passing through
the hands of appellee, and the entire
consideration of the indebtedness was the
deed to appellant. This case is, there-
fore, clearly distinguishable from that,
for here the entire consideration for the
551/2 acres passed directly from the ap-
pellant [who advanced the money] to
Dibbs, [the seller], and the deed ex-
ecuted to appellee, [the purchaser], on
the understanding, he was to give appel-
lant a mortgage on all his land, to secure
the payment. *** The consideration of the
mortgage was purchase money." This
decision was cited and followed in Magee
v. Magee, 51 Ill. 50-0, and has never been
overruled in any subsequent case. See
also: Steinkemeyer v. Gillespie, 82 Ill.
253; Small v. Stagg, 95 Ill, 39; Whitte-
more v. Shiell, 14 I11. App. 414.
CHICAGO-KENT REVIEW
Wisconsin Follows Suit
The distinction made by the Illinois
court on this point was approved by the
Supreme Court of Wisconsin in Carey v.
Boyle, 53 Wisc. 574, 11 N. W. 47, (18S1),
In the following language: "It must be
understood that the extension of this
equity to a third person is strictly con-
fined to those who furnish or advance the
purchase money to the purchaser in such
manner that they can be said to have
paid it to a vendor, either personally or
caused it to be paid on behalf or for the
benefit of the purchaser; and to this
extent they become parties to the trans-
action. It must not be a general loan,
to be used by the purchaser to pay the
consideration of the purchase or to be
used for any other purpose at his pleas-
ure. In such case, simply because the
money can be traced into the land as
having been paid by the purchaser to the
vendor as the whole or part of the pur-
chase money, gives the person who loan-
ed it no such right. This is the distinc-
tion made in many of the cases, and es-
pecially by the supreme court of Illi-
nois," citing Austin v. Underwood, Magee
v. Magee, and Eyster v. Hatheway, all
supra.
Some of the language in these three
Illinois cases would seem to indicate that
in order to be considered as purchase
money, the funds must not be used mere-
ly to pay the last installment of "a pre-
existing debt, created for the purchase of
the homestead." But when, in Allen v.
Hawley, 66 Ill. 164, the court was con-
fronted with facts that presented this
precise question, it was held that, to the
extent that the money loaned was applied
upon the balance due under a contract of
purchase, it was purchase money and was
superior to the homestead rights of the
purchaser's wife. This is also the rule
in Iowa, where in Laidley v. Aiken, 80
Iowa, 112, 45 N. W. 384, it is said that
"the fact that Gilpin [the seller] had
previously contracted to convey the land
does not affect the rights of the parties.
The money loaned by the mortgagees was
applied in payment of the purchase
money, just the same as it would have
been if the contract of purchase had been
made at the same time that the deed and
mortgages were given." The following
cases follow the above holding on this
minor question, although in some of them
the point was not raised, but the facts
show the cases to be in point; Marin v.
Knox, 117 Minn. 428, 136 N. W. 15;
Nicholson v. Aney, 127 Ia. 278, 103 N. W.
201; Prot. Epis. Ch. v. E. E. Lowe Co.,
131 Ga. 666, 63 S. E. 136; Demeter v.
Wilcox, 115 Mo. 634, 22 S. W. 613; Cake's
Appeal, 23 Pa. St. 186; Phillips v. Colvin,
114 Ark. 14, 169 S. W. 316.
Pennsylvania Most Drastic
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
took an earlier and even more emphatic
stand upon the question of the necessity
of payment by the lender direct to the
seller. The case of Lynch v. Dearth,
2 Pen. & W. 101, (Penn., 1830), is by
far the most severe decision on this point
that has been found. In this case the
seller, purchaser and lender met by ap-
pointment. The sheriff was also present,
as the seller had obtained judgment for
ejectment against the purchaser because
of his failure to pay the balance due on
the purchase price, which would have
entitled him to a deed. The lender paid
the proceeds of his loan to the sheriff,
who paid it to the seller, who delivered
his deed to the purchaser, who delivered
his mortgage to the lender. This surely
would have satisfied the requirement of
the Wisconsin court (Carey v. Boyle,
supra), for the money was certainly ad-
vanced "in such manner that" the lender
could "be said to have paid it to the
vendor, either personally or caused it to
be paid on behalf or for the benefit of
the purchaser; and to this extent" he be-
came a "party to the transaction." And
it would also undoubtedly have satisfied
the Illinois court, for the money was
"actually paid over by" the seller, "not
one dollar of it passing through the
hands of" the purchaser, and the "con-
sideration of the indebtedness was the
deed to" the purchaser, (Austin v. Un-
derwood, supra.) It is submitted that
the Pennsylvania court overlooked the
fact that the sheriff in this instance
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should have been considered as the agent
of the seller for the receipt of the money,
and the deal constituted one transaction,
which was In reality a novation, to which
the seller was a party, and not merely a
deal between the purchaser and the lender,
of which the seller merely had knowledge.
One of the judges filed a strong dissent-
ing opinion in which he said in part:
"When a man, having good title, sells by
articles of agreement, receives part of
the money, and is ready and willing to
make a good title to his vendee, on re-
ceiving the residue of the purchase
money, it is not in the power of that
vendee, or any person claiming through
him, to rescind the contract-refuse to
comply on his part, and compel the ven-
dor to pay back what he has received,
and keep the land; and yet that is, in
effect, what is asked in this case," a
judgment creditor of the purchaser being
decreed to have a lien superior to that of
the lender's mortgage; the lender was
thereby compelled to pay off the judg-
ment creditor of the purchaser (which
amounted to refunding to the purchaser
what he had previously paid on the
land), and to take over the premises in
satisfaction of his mortgage lien, which
is what the seller (in whose shoes the
lender stood) would have had to do if the
lender had remained aloof from the trans-
action. It would seem that the Wiscon-
sin Court, in Carey v. Boyle, supra, has
announced the correct rule on this point,
in simply confining the equity "to those
who furnish or advance the purchase
money to the purchaser in such manner
that they can be said to have paid it to
the vendor, either personally or caused it
to be paid on behalf or for the benefit of
the purchaser; and to this extent they be-
come parties to the transaction. It must
not be a general loan, to be used by the
purchaser to pay the consideration of the
purchase or to be used for any other pur-
pose at his pleasure."
The rule has been consistently applied
by the Pennsylvania court, as is shown by
the following cases: Campbell & Pharo's
Appeal, 12 Casey (36 Pa. St. Rep.) 247,
(1860), where the mortgagee won over
mechanic's liens arising from the pur-
chaser's contracts, because "The money
was not advanced on the credit of the
equitable estate at all, but distinctly upon
the security of a mortgage upon the legal
estate, for the purchase money, under a
contract with the vendor himself." Not-
tes's Appeal, 9 Wright (45 Pa. St. Rep.)
361, (1863), where the purchaser's
widow's dower won over the lender's lien
because "there was no communication be-
tween the vendor and Hoover [the lend-
er] for a security for purchase money."
Albright v. LaFayette, 102 Pa. St. Rep.
411 (1683), where it was said at page 418,
that "money borrowed by the vendee to
pay for land, becomes the money of the
borrower, and he may apply it as he
pleases; it follows, that a mortgage given
to secure its repayment would not be a
purchase money mortgage, whether the
money was so used, or used for any other
purpose." See also, Cohen's Appeal, 10
W. N. C. (Penn.) 544.
In Laidley v. Aiken, 80 Ia. 112, 45 N.
W. 384, (1890), the money was paid by
the lender direct to the seller, who there-
by secured a lien superior to a judgment
against the purchaser. If this had not
been done, says the court, "it may be that
the judgment would be a prior lien." And
such was In fact the decision of that court
when appropriate facts were presented
in the recent case of Ely Say. Bank v.
Graham, 201 Ia. 840, 208 N. W. 312,
(1926). These two cases are really con-
tra to the earlier decision of the same
court in Kaiser v. Lembeck, 55 Ia. 244,
7 N. W. 519, (1880), in which case the
report shows payment by the lender to
the purchasers, and by them to the
sellers, but the question was apparently
not raised by counsel, for the mortgage
was held to have been given for purchase
money without any discussion of this
point by the court. The still earlier case
of Gilman v. Dingeman, 49 Ia. 308, (1878),
is in accord with the two later cases
above cited, for, although the lender paid
the money direct to the seller, yet there
was no contract between them. Moreover,
the decision really turned upon the fact
that the mortgage was executed and
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recorded long after the deed to the pur-
chaser, and they did not constitute one
transaction.
The following cases will also be found
to be in accord with the Illinois ruile:
Shooters Is. Shipyard Co. v. Standard
Shipbuilding Corp., 293 Fed. 706; Cohn
v. Hoffman, 50 Ark. 108, 6 S. W. 511;
Bunting v. Jones, 78 N. C. 242 (dictum);
Calmes v. McCracken, 8 S. C. 98; Thomas
v. Hoge, 58 Kan. 166, 48 Pac. 844; Kittle
v. Van Dyck, 1 Sandf. Ch. (N. Y.) 76.
No Contrary Rule
No decisions have been found which
oppose this rule by declaring unequivo-
cally that no agreement between the lend-
er and the seller is necessary. There Is,
however, a large group of cases in which
it is apparent, or at least properly In-
ferred, that the payment was actually
made to the purchaser, and by him to the
seller. In none of these cases, however,
was the question raised by counsel or
discussed by the court, and it cannot
therefore be said that they establish a
rule in the respective jurisdictions contra
to that adhered to by the Illinois, Wis-
consin, and Pennsylvania courts. More-
over, in most of these cases other cir-
cumstances were of sufficient importance
to outweigh the absence of this one ele-
ment. The following cases are in point:
Ray v. Adams, 4 Hun. 332; Haywood v.
Nooney, 3 Barb. 643; Kaiser v. Lembeck,
supra; Jones v. Parker, 51 Wisc. 218, 8
N. W. 124; Cowardin v. Anderson, 78 Va.
88; Van Loben Sels v. Bunnell, 120 Calif.
680, 53 Pac. 266; Lassen v. Vance, 8 Cal.
271; Missouri St. Life Ins Co. v. Barnes
Const. Co. et al., 147 Ga. 677,95 S. E. 244;
Vigars v. Hewins, 184 Ia. 683, 169 N. W.
119; Stewart v. Smith, 36 Minn. 82, 30 N.
W. 430;, Jones v. Tainter, 15 Minn. 512
(Gil. 423); Nichols v. Overacker, 16 Kan.
54; Acruman v. Barnes, 66 Ark. 442, 51
S. W. 319; Savings Bank & Trust Co., v.
Brock 196 N. C. 24, 144 S. E. 365. (1929).
Instantaneous Seizin
We come now to a consideration of the
second class of cases, viz., those In which
the lender's priority of lien hinges upon
simultaneous execution and delivery of
the deed and mortgage. The cases, as
stated before, which turn upon the ap-
plication of the recording statutes of the
various states, are not included in the
present inquiry. It should also be noted
that this phase of the question concerns
the conventional type of purchase money
mortgage, from the purchaser to the
seller, equally with a mortgage to secure
a purchase money loan. There is, how-
ever, this practical difference to be noted,
that, where there are only two parties
concerned in the transaction, there is
proportionately less occasion for a failure
to deliver the deed and mortgage simul-
taneously, than where three parties must
be gotten together by appointment to
close a deal. No jurisdiction has been
found in which any distinction is made
between the two classes of purchase
money mortgages, so far as instantaneous
seizin is concerned. They were ranked
together by Chancellor Kent in the fol-
lowing passage from the 4th volume of
his Commentaries, page 39: "A transi-
tory seizin for an instant, when the same
act that gives the estate to the husband
conveys it out of him, as in the case of a
connusee of a fine, is not sufficient to
give the wife dower. Nor is the seizin
sufficient when the husband takes a con-
veyance in fee, and at the same time
mortgages the land back to the grantor,
or to a third person, to secure the pur-
chase money in whole or in part."
Strict Construction: No Physical Gap
The cases upon this point divide them-
selves naturally into two classes which
arise from either a strict or a liberal
application of the doctrine of instantane-
ous seizin. The strict construction Is well
illustrated by the case of Moring v. Dick-
erson, 85 N. C. 466, (1881), from which
we quote as follows: "In our view of
the case the mortgage given for the pur-
chase money stands upon the higher
ground and is entitled to precedence, not
upon the ground of any supposed equity
in the vendor as such to have the pur-
chase money of the land sold or any
right of subrogation in the defendant
Farrar to his lien upon the land, but
purely and simply upon the ground that
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the two instruments, being executed at
the same moment of time, are to be
treated as one and construed as If
the association [the seller] had con-
veyed the land directly to her (the
lender] and had not made use of
the defendant Dickerson [the pur-
chaser and borrower] as an instrument
to that end. If there had been an in-
terval of time between the two trans-
actions during which the title to the land
had rested in Dickerson, then this right
of priority would have been lost to her
and attached to the elder mortgage." To
the same effect is Rawlings v. Lowndes,
34 Md. 639, (1871), where the appellee
insisted "that although the deed was de-
livered on the 28th of October, and the
mortgage acknowledged and delivered on
the 14th of November following, they
nevertheless constitue and form parts of
one and the same transaction, and the
husband's seizin being therefore Instant-
eneous and not beneficial, his widow is
not entitled to dower." But the court's
reply was that the mortgage "did not
take effect until its acknowledgment and
delivery; and it is clear that during the
time intervening between the 28th of Oc-
tober, the day on which the deed was
delivered, and the 14th of November, the
day on which the mortgage was acknow-
ledged and delivered, the husband had a
beneficial seizin in the land, and a sale
by him to a bona f de purchaser without
notice, would have passed title even as
against the lien of Reed for unpaid pur-
chase money. If, therefore, it was the
purpose of Reed, that the dower right of
the wife should be postponed to his mort-
gage, it was his business to see that both
instruments were delivered at the same
time.", The same reasoning controls in
the following cases: Western Tie &
Timber Co. v. Campbell, 113 Ark. 570,
169 S. W. 253; Cohn v. Hoffman, 50 Ark.
108, 6 S. W. 511; Gilman v. Dingeman, 49
Ia. 308; Cake's Appeal, 23 Pa. St. 180;
Calmes v. McCracken, 8 S. C. 98; Faulk-
ner County Bank & Trust Co. v. Vail,
(Ark.) 293 S. W. 40, (1927); Savings
Bank & Trust Co. v. Brock, 196 N. C. 24,
144 S. E. 365, (1928); State v. Johnson,
(Ttab) 26 Pac. 561. (1928).
Our own state of Illinois must be class-
ed among those in which the rule is
strictly applied, as has already appeared
from the passage hereinbefore quoted
from Curtis v. Root, supra. See also
Christy v. Hall, 46 Ill. 117; Roane v.
Baker, 120 Ill. 308; Elder v. Derby et al,
98 Ill. 228.
Liberal Doctrine: One Transaction
The more liberal construction is best
illustrated by the decisions of the Sup-
reme Court of Minnesota. In Stewart v.
Smith, 36 Minn. 82, 30 N. W. 430, (1886),
the purchaser, Burlingham, "being desir-
ous of entering this land by pre-emption,
applied to Sidle for money with which to
make the entry; that it was agreed
between them that Sidle should lend
Burlingham the money or land-warrant
with which to make the entry, and that,
as security therefor, Burlingham should
give Sidle a purchase-money mortgage on
the land when entered; that pursuant to
the agreement Sidle loaned Burlingham
the funds with which to enter the land;
that thereupon Burlingham immediately
went from his home (both parties resid-
ed in Minneapolis, 80 or 90 miles distant
from the land office) to Forest City, ***
and *** on Friday, Sept. 13th, entered the
land, paying therefor with the funds
loaned him by Sidle, and immediately
started back for his home, where he ar-
rived on Sunday, Sept. 15th; that on
Monday, September 16th, pursuant to the
agreement above referred to, he and his
wife executed to Sidle the mortgage in
question***." In giving this mortgage pre-
cedence over a previously rendered judg-
ment against Burlingham, the purchaser,
the court said that "The doctrine which
gives precedence, in such cases, to a pur-
chase-money mortgage, is one of equity,
and not of statutory origin, and applies to
any claim to or lien upon the property
arising through the mortgagor. The
present case is also sought to be taken
out of the operation of the rule because
the purchase of land, and the execution
of the mortgage, were not simultaneous;
Burllngham having entered the land, and
obtained his certificate of entry on Fri-
day. Sentemb.r-..0t -I," *%- --....
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to Sidle was not executed until Monday,
September 16th. The rule, as generally
stated in the books, is that to give a
purchase-money mortgage this precedence
it must have been executed simultane-
ously, or at the same time, with the
deed of purchase. Some ground for a
narrow and literal construction of this
language Is furnished by the fact that the
reason usually assigned for the doctrine
is the technical one of the mere transi-
tory seizin of the mortgagor, rather than
the superior equity which the mortgagee
has to be paid the purchase money of the
land before it shall be subjected to other
claims against the purchaser. But it Is
evident, both upon principle and au-
thority, that what is meant by this state-
ment of the rule is not that the two acts
-the execution of the deed of purchase,
and the execution of the mortgage-
should be literally simultaneous. This
would be almost an Impossibility. Some
lapse of time must necessarily intervene
between the two acts. An examination
of the cases will show that the real test
is not whether the deed and mortgage
were in fact executed at the same instant,
or even on the same day, but whether
they were parts of one continuous trans-
action, and so intended to be, so that the
two instruments should be given con-
temporaneous operation in order to pro-
mote the intent of the parties. *** The
facts bring the case clearly within the
rule. There was a previous agreement that
Burlingham should, after entering the
land, give Sidle a purchase-money mort-
gage upon it. The mortgage subsequent-
ly executed in pursuance of that agree-
ment, and as soon after the entry of the
land as was reasonably practicable. Both
acts were evidently intended by the par-
ties as parts of a single continuous trans-
action." This case is cited and followed in
Marin v. Knox, 117 Minn. 428, 136 N. W.
15, (1912). To the same effect are Shooter's
Island Shipyard Co. v. Standard Ship-
building Corp., 293 Fed. 706, (1923); New
Jersey Bldg. Loan & Inv. Co. v. Bachelor,
54 N. J. Eq. 600, 35 AtI. 745, (1896);
Jones v. Tainter, 15 Minn. 512, (Gil.
423); Ray v. Adams, 4 Hun. (N. Y.) 332;
Demeter v. Wilcox, 115 Mo. 634, 22 S. W.
613, (1893); East Ruth. Say. Loan &
Bldg. Assn. v. Neblo et al (N. J.) 139 Atl.
172, (1927).
In leaving this phase of the subject,
it is almost superfluous to say that the
careful practitioner in any Jurisdiction
will always see to it that the strict in-
terpretation of the rule is complied with
by insisting upon simultaneous delivery
and recording of the seller's deed and the-
purchaser's mortgage.
Lender vs. Vendor
Finally we have for consideration that
class of cases in which a mortgage from
the purchaser to the seller to secure part
of the purchase price contends for priori-
ty with a mortgage to a third party to
secure the re-payment of money loaned
with which to complete the purchase. A
typical case, (so far as the facts are con-
cerned), is that of Koevenig v. Schmitz,
et al, 71 Ia. 175, 32 N. W. 32a, (1887),
in which the purchaser gave a mortgage
to the seller for one-half of the purchase
price, and also gave a mortgage to a lend-
er to secure his note for money loaned
with which to pay the other half of the
purchase price. Neither seller nor lender
contracted with the purchaser expressly
for a first mortgage; neither knew of the
purchaser's agreement to give a mort-
gage to the other. The lender paid the
money to the purchaser, who in turn
paid it to the seller. The mortgages were
delivered simultaneously by the pur-
chaser to the recorder for recording. The
case as reported does not state when the
deed to the seller was delivered or record-
ed, but as the mortgages are both stated
to have been executed on the same day
that the purchase was made, it is fair
to assume that the deed to the purchaser
was delivered by him to the recorder
along with the mortgages. However, the
question of instantaneous seizin is not
touched upon in the opinion. The court
held that "As the liens created by the
mortgages accrued at the same Instant,
neither of the parties has any rights In
the property superior to those of the
other," and decreed that the proceeds
of the property should be applied pro
rata to the debts secured by the two
CHICAGO-KENT REVIEW
mortgages. It was argued on behalf of
the seller that, as the seller surrendered
his vendor's lien when he accepted the
mortgage, and as the lender had no prior
interest or right in the property, and
"surrendered nothing when he accepted
the mortgage" [i.e., surrendered no right
in the property], that therefore the seller
should have priority over the lender. But
the court held that "The mortgage creat-
ed a new and distinct lien on the prop-
erty. It did not have the effect to con-
tinue or preserve the vendor's lien, but
that lien ceased when the parties accept-
ed the mortgage. The vendor's lien arises
by implication of the law. But a mort-
gage lien is created and measured by the
contract of the parties. When a party
accepts a mortgage, he acquires the
rights and interest simply which accrue
under the contract. The law neither
adds to nor detracts from them." The
seller was therefore held to have no ad-
vantage from the fact that his mortgage
was given to secure the purchase money.
Seller Has Superior Equity
The decision is, to say the least, shock-
ing to one's sense of justice. The absence
of any authorities cited in support is
conspicuous. The weight of opposing
authority is irresistible. The facts in
Schoch v. Birdsall, 48 Minn. 441, 51 N. W.
382, (1892), are almost identical with
those in Koevenig v. Schmitz, supra, but
in the Minnesota case the court held that
"the plaintiff [seller] was not bound to
search for conveyances made by his
grantee while the latter was a stranger
to the title, and before the execution of
his deed, and the defendant [lender]
whose mortgage was recorded before
plaintiff's [seller's] conveyance was
not a subsequent bona fide mortgagee,
within the meaning of the recording act.
In no view of the case is her mortgage
entitled to priority," citing Dusenbury v.
Hulbert, 59 N. Y. 541, where it was also
said, on page 545, that "A vendor of real
estate has no occasion to examine the
records for incumbrances created prior
to his conveyance. He has the power
to protect himself by a qualified or con-
ditional transfer, or by any legal mode
of creating a lien to secure himself for
unpaid purchase-money. When he conveys
and instantly takes a reconveyance as
such security, no authority is needed to
demonstrate the gross injustice of per-
mitting a prior mortgage from interven-
ing to his prejudice." Schoch v. Birdsall
is cited and followed in the recent case
of O'Halloran v. Marriage, et al., 167.
Minn. 443, 209 N. W. 271 (1926). The
following cases are also unanimous in
support: Turk v. Funk, 68 Mo. 18; Boyd
v. Mundorf, 30 N. J. Eq. 545; Clark v.
Brown, 3 Allen (Mass.) 509; Oliver v.
Davy, 34 Minn. 292, 25 N. W. 629; Rogers
v. Tucker, 94 Mo. 346; Bank's Appeal, 91
Pa. St. 163; Van Loben Sels v. Bunnell,
et al., 120 Cal. 680, 53 Pac. 266; Boies v.
Benham, 127 N. Y. 620, 28 N. E. 657;
Brower v. Witmeyer, 121 Ind. 83, 22 N. E.
975; Truesdale v. Brennan, 153 Mo. 600,
55 S. W. 147; Protection Bldg. & Loan
Assn. v. Knowles, et al., 54 N. J. Eq. 519,
34 Atl. 1083, affirmed in 55 N. J. Eq. 822,
41 Atl. 1116; Brasted v. Sutton, 29 N. J.
Eq. 513; Montgomery v. Keppel, et al.,
75 Cal. 128, 19 Pac. 178; Foster Lbr. Co.
v. Harlan County Bank, 71 Kans. 158,
80 Pac. 49; Hinton v. Hicks, 156 N. C.
24, 7r S. E. 1086; Belvin v. Paper Co.,
123 N. C. 138, 31 S. E. 655; Frazier v.
Center, 1 M'Cord Eq. (S.C.) 270; East
Ruth. Say. Loan & Bldg. Assn. v. Neblo,
et al., 139 Atl. (N.J.) 172 (1927); Sav-
ings Bank & Trust Co. v. Brock, 196 N. C.
24, 144 S. E. 365 (1928); Ex Parte John-
son, 147 S. C. 259, 145 S. E. 113, (1928).
Importance of Privity Between Lender
and Vendor
It might be thought at first blush that
these cases expose a weakness in the
equitable rights of a lender of purchase
money, and furnish an argument against
classifying his mortgage as a purchase
money lien; but in none of the cases cited
is there an intimation that, as to all
claims arising through the purchaser,
other than the purchaser's mortgage to
the vendor, the lender's mortgage would
not take precedence. The cases should
rather be taken as indicative of the im-
portance to the lender of contracting with
the seller as well as the nurebn,' *I,
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point upon which the Illinois, Wisconsin
and Pennsylvania courts laid so much em-
phasis, as herein before stated. This
phase of such a contest between two
purchase money mortgages is still better
illustrated by Heffron v. Flanagan, 37
Mich. 274, in which the lender's mortgage
won precedence because the seller deliv-
ered his deed to the purchaser in the
presence of the lender, and at the same
time the purchaser's mortgage to the
lender was delivered, and the proceeds
of the loan were paid over to the seller
at the request of the purchaser, and the
seller was therefore estopped by his
silence from claiming that his purchase
money mortgage, which had previously
been delivered to and recorded by him,
was entitled to preference. Other good
cases on this point are: Ellsberry v.
Duval-Percival Tr. Co., et al, 282 S. W.
1054 (Mo.) (1926); Thompson v. Litwood
Oil & Sup. Co., et al 287 S. W. 279 (Tex.)
(1926); State v. Johnson, 268 Pac. 361
(Utah) (1922).
Contra Decisions Examined
There are three jurisdictions, viz.,
Maryland, Ohio and Louisiana, in which
decisions have been rendered that appear
upon casual inspection to be opposed to
the weight of authority, and they should,
therefore, have our careful consideration.
The first of these is the Maryland case
of Heulsler v. Nickum, 38 Md. 270, in
which the court had the task of inter-
preting a statute which provides that
"Whenever lands are sold and conveyed,
and a mortgage is given by the purchaser
at the same time to secure payment of
the purchase moiiey, such mortgage shall
be preferred to any previous judgment,
which may have been obtained against
such purchaser." The opinion first handed
down by the court was based upon an ab-
sence of instantaneous seizin, the war-
ranty deed of the seller bearing date of
Sept. 15 1869, and the mortgage to a
Building and Loan Assn. which advanced
the money to the purchaser, being dated
Sept. 18, 18'9, three days later, which
interval was held to permit prior exist-
ing Judgments against the purchaser to
0a+tnh and become liens superior to aid
mortgage. After this opinion was filed
the court's attention was called to an
agreement of counsel (which had escaped
the court's observation) to the effect that
the mortgage and warranty deed had
been delivered simultaneously, though
bearing different dates. The court then
filed a supplemental opinion in which
it is stated that the phraseology of
the statute above quoted "plainly im-
plies that it referred to cases where the
vendor having conveyed the land, took
at the same time from the purchaser, a
mortgage to secure the payment of the
purchase money. The terms "purchase
money" do not include any money that
may be borrowed to complete a purchase,
but that which is stipulated to be paid
by the purchaser to the vendor, as be-
tween them only it is purchase money;
as between the purchaser and lender, it
is borrowed money.
"But it is said the spirit and equity of
the Act, if not its language, would em-
brace any one advancing money, to pay
for lands bought by another.
"Such a construction is decidedly
against the tenor of our decisions referred
to in the previous opinion filed in this
case. Vide 6 Md., 56, and cases there
cited.
"It is equivalent to assigning the ven-
dor's lien without limit, and might sub-
Ject judgment creditors to many embar-
rassments, not now foreseen.
"Believing the framers of the law had
no such latitudinarian views, we are of
the opinion that the mortgage given in
this case, is not within the section re-
ferred to, and is not preferred to pre-
vious judgment creditors."
The decisions referred to as having
been cited in the main opinion do not
at any point deal with the equitable
considerations which have led the courts
of so many other states to decree prior
rights to mortgages given to secure pur-
chase money loans. The court In the sup-
plementary opinion attempts to make a
distinction between a purchase money
mortgage of the conventional type, and a
mortgage given to secure money loaned to
the purchaser with which to make the
purchase, but cites no cases other than,
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those reviewed in the main opinion, all of
which are based on instantaneous seizin.
If the deed and mortgage in Heuisler vs.
Nickum had been dated, acknowledged,
delivered and recorded simultaneously,
then the court plainly implies in the
opinion as first filed, that the prior
judgments against the purchaser would
have been postponed to the lien of the
mortgage.
The Maryland statute above quoted is
identical in wording with that of the New
York statute which was the basis of the
decision in Jackson vs. Austin, 15 Johns.
477, where it was said that "a just
and fair construction will warrant its
application to the present case," in which
the mortgage was to one who advanced
the money with which the purchase was
made. This New York case was cited
by counsel, but was ignored by the court
in rendering its opinion. In the supple-
mentary opinion the court admits that
the fact of simultaneous delivery of the
deed and mortgage satisfied the require-
ment of instantaneous seizin, but still re-
fuses to give the mortgage priority over
previously rendered judgments against
the purchaser on the ground that mort-
gage was given to secure a loan, and not
to secure the payment of a balance due
to the seller on the purchase price. No
new citations or any reasoning whatever
are given in support of the court's arbi-
trary position in this case.
No Privity Between Lender and Vendor
It should be said to the credit of the
court that the opinion as first filed calls
attention to the fact that in the mort-
gage to the lender, "There is no reference
whatever to the purchase by the mort-
gagor of Dempster (the seller] or the
application of the money advanced by the
Building Association [the lender] to the
payment of the purchase money;" and
again: "There is nothing in the record,
to show privity between Mary Dempster,
the vendor, and the Amicable Building
Association, the mortgagee. The lien of
the vendor was extinguished by the ap-
plication of the money borrowed from the
mortgagee.***" It is interesting to specu-
late as to what effect it would have had
upon the decision if the evidence had
shown payment of the proceeds of the
loan by the lender direct to the vendor,
and if the previously rendered Illinois,
Wisconsin, and Pennsylvania decisions on
this phase of the question had been cited
to the court for consideration. These cases
seem to have been overlooked by both
counsel and court, and it is very possible
that due consideration of them would
have won a decision for the lender.
Later Maryland Decisions Confusing
But it is unnecessary to pine and sigh
over what might have been, for the
Maryland court itself has come to the
rescue by qualifying its position in a
later decision, that of Glenn, et al, vs.
Clark, 53 Md. 380, where we find, on page
609, that "If instead of making the mort-
gage directly to the vendor, it be made
to a third person who furnishes the pur-
chase money, or from whom it is bor-
rowed by the purchaser for the purpose of
paying the purchase money, the same
principle of equity applies in favor of
the mortgagee, provided the whole con-
stituted one and the same transaction;
and in such case the rights of the mort-
gagee are paramount to the right of
dower of the wife of the purchaser."
This decision places Maryland squarely
in line with the weight of authority
in other states, at least so far as a
purchaser's wife's claim for dower is
concerned, and it is difficult to see how
the Maryland court can escape from ap-
plying this same reasoning to the claim
of a judgment creditor of the purchaser,
under a judgment rendered prior to the
conveyance to the purchaser. Both the
dower and judgment claims are legal in
nature and are sought to be collected out
of property which, to the extent of the
mortgage over which priority is claimed,
has never been paid for by nor belonged
to the purchaser, through whom both
claims arise.
The force of the adverse holding i.
Heuisler vs. Nickum was also much
weakened by the following paragraph in
Ahern vs. White, 39 Md. 409, at pages
419-420: "In Heuisler vs. Nickum, 38 Md.
270, a party purchased and received TP
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deed for the land, and three days after-
ward mortgaged it, not to the vendor, but
to a third party, and we held, after a
review of the previous decisions, Includ-
ing that of Rawlings vs. Lowndes, that
a prior -udgment against the vendee had
preference over the mortgage, because
of the interval of three days during
which the interest of the mortgagor in
fee under the deed to him, was subject
to be seized in execution on the judg-
ment. An agreement of counsel in the
case, which at first had escaped the at-
tention of the court, to the effect that
the mortgage was given simultaneously
with the deed, and that the money ob-
tained from the mortgagee was applied in
payment of the purchase money, induced
the filing of a suplemental opinion, in
which it was determined that the 3rd
section of Article 64 of the Code applied
only to cases where It is given to the
vendor to secure the purchase money,
and not to a case where it is given to
a third party, though the money thus
obtained may have been applied to pay
for the property. That was all the Court
intended to decide by this supplemental
opinion. The priority of the judgment
was left to stand as in the original
opinion upon the interval of time between
the deed and the mortgage, during which
the interest of the purchaser under his
deed, was liable to be seized in execu-
tion on the judgment."
It will be seen that the court here
states that the decision in Heuisler vs.
Nickum rests upon the absence of In-
stantaneous seizin, and in the same
breath admits that the deeds were simul-
taneously delivered and the seizin was
therefore instantaneous. It is expressly
stated that the decision did not turn upon
the question of whether a mortgage to
secure a loan to the purchaser with
which to complete the purchase is a pur-
chase money loan or not. The court
therefore admits that its holding on this
question, as set forth in the supplemen-
tary opinion in Heuisler vs. Nickum, is
a mere dictum. It is submitted that this
dictum, expressed in a case where a
prior judgment was Involved, is irrecon-
cilable with the later holding In Glenn
vs. Clark, where the dower rights of a
purchaser's widow were at stake.
The confusion in which the court has
become involved on this subject Is made
even more manifest by another paragraph
from Glenn v. Clark, supra: "The de-
cision of Heuisler vs. Nickum turned
upon the construction of the 3d section,
Art. 64, of the Code, in which the term
"purchase money" was held to mean the
sum stipulated to be paid by the pur-
chaser to the vendor, and did not include
money that may be borrowed to complete
the purchase. This last decision rests
upon the construction of the words of the
code, and has no application to the doc-
trine of transitory seisin."
The Maryland Court cannot be said to
be unalterably opposed to the principle
contended for when that court has made
contradictory statements as to the real
basis of the decision in Heuisler vs.
Nickum, and when it has, in Glenn vs.
Clark, held in favor of the principle when
the dower of a purchaser's widow is in-
volved, instead of the claim of the pur-
chaser's judgment creditor.
Ohio and Louisiana Not Contra
As to Ohio, it will be found that Stan-
sell v. Roberts, 13 Ohio 148, 42 Am. Dec.
193, the leading case on the subject in
that state, is very similar to the Illinois
case of Eyster v. Hatheway, supra, in that
the proceeds of the loan were not paid to
the seller, but to the purchaser, and the
court calls attention to the fact that the
lender was not privy to the sale transac-
tion, and. that he looked to no other se-
curity than that afforded by the mort-
gage. The same element is absent from
the facts in Building Assn. v. Clark, 43
Ohio St., 427, 2 N. E. 846, and Mutual Aid
Bldg., etc., Co. v. Gashe, 6 Oh. Cir. Dec.
779. While this is not sufficient basis for
assurance that the Ohio Supreme Court
will follow those of Illinois, Pennsylvania
and Wisconsin, yet until a proper case Is
presented to and passed upon by that
court, Ohio cannot be said to be an out-
law upon this question.
The case of Fontenot et al, v. Solleau,
2 La. Ann. 774, (1947) Is also worthy of
comment as not being in harmony with
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the weight of authority. Here the pur-
chaser's wife had a valid legal mortgage
on her husband's property which was of
such a nature as to bind after acquired
property. The husband borrowed money
from a third party with which to pur-
chase land from the government, and on
the same day that the purchase was made
he executed a mortgage to the third party
to secure the re-payment of the money
loaned. The court held that the 3d party
was not "entitled to the vendor's privi-
lege. The privilege of a vendor would
have existed in favor of the United
States, had they sold on a credit; and In
that case a subrogation of such right
might have been made in favor of the
plaintiffs by the vendor. But as the sale
was for cash, and the price was paid
down at the time of sale by Soileau, the
vendor's privilege never existed. Privi-
leges are matters stricti Juris. They exist
only in those cases which the lawgiver
has expressly declared. C. C. 3152. The
case before us Is not protected by the
Code, and however strongly Its hardship
may appeal to the conscience of the de-
fendant, there is no authority in us to
relieve the plaintiff." No citations are
given in support of this decision. The
present writer has found no other case
on the subject of purchase money mort-
gages, either in Louisiana or any other
jurisdiction, in which this case Is cited
or followed. It confers a benefit upon the
wife of the purchaser, as mortgagee un-
der a mortgage executed by her husband
five years before the purchase was made,
for which she gave no consideration what-
ever, and the court admits that the hard-
ship upon the party loaning the money
is not without appeal to one's conscience.
The facts are practically Identical with
those involved In the two Minnesota cases
hereinbefore cited, viz., Jones v. Tainter,
and Stewart v. Smith, In which cases a
contrary decision was announced, and
supported by sound reasoning. It Is, there-
fore, submitted that this Louisiana deci-
sion is not worthy of consideration by the
courts of other jurisdictions. It may be
that the decision would have been differ-
ent If the proceeds of the sale had been
paid direct to the seller, as the court does
not specify just how the vendor could
have made a subrogation of his right in
favor of the plaintiffs [lenders). Louisi-
ana is, therefore, in much the same posi-
tion as Ohio.
Rules of Practice
Four important rules of practice are
deducible from the study of this subject.
The first, and most imperative, is that
the lender, in order to be sure of securing
a purchase money lien, should contract
with the seller, as well as with the pur-
chaser, for such a lien, and should pay
the proceeds of the loan direct to the
seller.
The second is that, as evidence of com-
pliance with the first rule, a recital
should be inserted in the seller's deed to
the effect that it is subject to the lien of
a purchase money mortgage to the lender
to secure the payment of notes delivered
to the lender by the purchaser, and a
further recital that the seller, by deliver-
ing this deed, acknowledges receipt, di-
rect from the lender, of the proceeds of
said notes. This recital would estop the
seller from claiming priority over the
lender for any other purchase money
mortgage which the purchaser might
have given to him. In the mortgage there
should be a corresponding recital to the
effect that It is given by the purchaser to
secure the payment of his notes which
he has delivered to the lender, proceeds
of which notes the lender is requested to
pay direct to the seller.
The third rule is that the deed from the
seller to the purchaser, and the mortgage
or trust deed from the purchaser to the
lender or to his trustee, should be dated
and acknowledged, and must be delivered
and recorded, simultaneously.
The fourth rule is concerned with the
practical problem of the necessity of
proving to any prospective purchaser of
the notes the fact that the proceeds of
said notes, given by the purchaser, were
paid by the lender direct to the seller.
This is, however, the same problem that
exists in the case of the ordinary pur-
chase money mortgage given by the pur-
chaser to the seller. The recital of the
facts in the deeds, as above suggested.
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would be only prima facie evidence, for
purchase money priority in every in-
stance arises from the equities of the
case, and not from any contract, or the
intention of the parties; it is based oi,
what was actually done, not upon what
the parties say they did. Continental-
Equitable Title, etc., Co. vs. Conservation
Bldg., etc., Assoc., 266 Pa. 298, 109 Atl.
776. The best solution consists in having
the entire transaction handled by a re-
sponsible bank or trust company as
escrowee, the lender depositing the pro-
ceeds of his loan with said escrowee, with
instructions to pay the same direct to the
seller, (not to the borrower), when title
conditions have been satisfactorily com-
plied with by the seller. The evidence
would thus be always available in the
files of the escrowee, a neutral party,
showing that all the requirements set
forth in the above cited decisions have
been complied with, so as to make the
mortgage in question a valid purchase
money mortgage. The problem is, of
course, much simplified if a title guar-
antee policy on the mortgage s procured,
as the evidence need then be submitted
but once, viz., to the company issuing
the policy.
It is believed that a wide spread ac-
quaintance of realtors, lenders and law.
yers, with the equitable principle under-
lying the decisions herein discussed, will
result in the saving of much time and
expense in the closing of deals to which
the principle is applicable.
Other cases which are in point on the
general question, and which have not
been previously cited herein, are as fol-
lows: Birmingham Bldg & Loan Assn. v.
Boggs, 116 Ala. 587, 22 So. 852; Faulkner
County Bank & Trust Co. v. Vail, 293
S. W. 40, (Ark.) (1927); Dillon v. Byrne,
5 Cal. 455, (1855); Carr v. Caldwell, 10
Cal. 380, (1858); Lassen v. Vance, 8 Cal.
271, (1857) ; Beck v. Elliott, 220 N. W. 448,
(S. Dak.) (1928); Achey v. Coleman, 92
Ga. 745, 19 S. E. 710; Missouri St. Life
Ins. Co. v. Barnes Cost Co. et aL, 147
Ga. 677, 95 S. E. 244; Ballew v. Roler et
al., 124 Ind. 557, 24 N. E. 976; Butler v,
Thornburg, 131 Ind. 237, 30 N. E. 1073;
Barrett v. Lewis, 106 Ind. 120, 5 N. E.
930; Yarlott v. Brown, 149 N. E. 921,
(Ind.) (1925); Foster Lbr. Co. v. Harlan
County Bank, 71 Kans. 158, 80 Pac. 49;
Warren Mtg.-Co. v. Winters, 94 Kan. 615,
146 Pac. 1012, (1915); Smith v. Stanley,
37 Me. 11, 58 Am. Dec., 771; Hazleton
v. Lesure, 9 Allen (Mass.) 24; King v.
Stetson, 11 Allen (Mass.) 407; Wheadon
v. Mead, 72 Minn. 372, 75 N. W. 598;
Adams v. Hill, 9 Foster, (29 N. H.) 202;
Bradley v. Bryan 43 N. J. Eq. 376, 13 AtI.
806; Hopler v. Cutler et al., (N. J. Ch.)
34 Atl. 746; Clark v. Butler, 32 N. J. Eq.
664; De Garmo v. Phelps, 176 N. Y. 455,
69 N. E. 873; Duer v. Jaeger, 113 Misc.
743, 186 N. Y. S. 584; Wel v. Casey, 125
N. C. 356, 34 S. E. 506; Butterfield's Ap-
peal, 77 Pa. St. Rep. 197; Groce v. Ponder,
63 S. C. 162, 41 S. E. 83; Ins. Co. v.
Stephens, 15 Pac. (Utah) 253; Roush v.
Miller, 39 W. Va. 638, 20 S. E. 663; Com.
Title Ins. & Trust Co. v. Ellis, 192 Pa.
St. 321; Houlehan v. Rassler, 73 Wisc.
557, 41 N. W. 720; Colonial Trust Co. v.
Sterchie Bros., 169 N. C. 21, 85 S. E. 40;
Powers v. Pense, 20 Wyo. 327, 123 Pac.




The scholarship averages of the eight
fraternities represented at Chicago Kent
have been compiled for the second semes-
ter of the 1928-29 college term. The aver-
ages and relative standing of the fratern-
ities in the scholarship cup contest fol-
lows:
Alpha Sigma Iota .......... 1.706
Phi Delta Phi ............. 1.674
Sigma Delta Kappa ........ 1.575
Delta Theta Phi ........... 1.488
Nu Beta Epsilon ........... 1.483
Kappa Beta Pi ............ 1.402
Phi Alpha Delta ........... 1.387
Delta Chi ................. L084
This is the first time that Alpha Sigma
Iota have gained possession of the cov-
eted cup. Previously Phi Alpha Delta
had won it once, Delta Chi twice, Nu Beta
Epsilon three times and Phi Delta Phi
five times.
